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4Abstract
One of the key problems in the design of a currency union is macroeconomic
stabilization. Assuming that all policy-makers in the European Monetary
Union are "disciplined" according to the rules set by the Maastricht Treaty and
the Stability and Growth Pact, this paper addresses the question of whether
member countries will effectively be sheltered against undesirable
macroeconomic fluctuations. The analytical thrust of the paper is that having
disciplined policy-makers does not exhaust the problem of policy design.
Stabilization in the EMU may be pursued by means of centralized monetary
policy as well as by means of national fiscal policies. Hence, the Tinbergen-
Meade problem of efficient choice and assignment of stabilization instruments
arises, a problem that has hitherto been disregarded. The main conclusion is
that the now popular idea that the European Central Bank will cope with
union-wide shocks while national governments will stabilize domestic shocks is
not always the most efficient assignment choice, and it is inconsistent with the
imposition of a fiscal deficit ceiling on member countries.
Keywords: European Monetary Union, macroeconomic policy
J.E.L. classification: E5, E6
5ONE "MONETARY GIANT" WITH MANY "FISCAL DWARFS": THE
EFFICIENCY OF MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICIES
IN THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION
1. Introduction
My own judgement is that, on balance, a European Monetary Union would be
an economic liability. The gains from reduced transaction costs would be small
and might, when looked at from the global point of view, be negative. At the
same time, EMU would increase cyclical instability, raising the cyclical
unemployment rate (Feldstein, (1997)).
Feldstein's famous  criticism of the EMU endeavour pointed out
one of the key problems facing the new monetary institution:
macroeconomic stabilization. The debate on this issue is still lively,  for
economists disagree on its theoretical or practical relevance while the
historical evidence is too short-lived to help discriminate among
different predictions. Nonetheless, downgrading the stabilization issue
may turn out be a mistake with implications stretching well beyond
welfare considerations within each member country.
It is clear that the EMU has not been conceived and  pursued
with great determination for its own sake. Its founders viewed it as the
first building block  in a system of truly federal institutions in Europe.
As is well known, European citizens have historically ranked protection
against adverse conditions high on their political demand schedule.
Hence longer and wider phases of recession or inflation  than in the past
may undermine the credibility of the promise of the "EMU dividend",
and may impair the political will to go ahead  with the deepening of the
European Union. At the same time, strong incentives to deviate from
"fiscal and monetary discipline" may mount up, together with political
6pressures on the ECB, determining a paradoxical self-defeat of the
entire defensive system erected by the Maastricht Treaty.
 As regards theory, according to the traditional optimal currency
areas approach, the stabilization problem arises in relation to the
peculiar institutional setup of the EMU. Member countries have
relinquished independent monetary policy and exchange-rate
determination in favour of a single monetary authority (MA),  while
their national fiscal authorities (FAs) have (self-)restrained domestic
fiscal policy within the limits imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP). Hence, it is argued that two major obstacles may hinder
stabilization policy: first, member countries may find themselves short
of instruments in the event of individual shocks; second, national FAs
may find it costly or impossible to co-ordinate their fiscal policies were it
beneficial to do so vis-à-vis the policy stance of the MA1. These concerns
are by no means universally shared, however, since a substantial
number of economists are ready to subscribe to the view that a
‘monetary giant’ surrounded by ‘fiscal dwarfs’ is a better guarantee of
the independence of the central bank, of monetary and financial
stability, of restricted growth of the public sector, and of fiscal
discipline. Therefore, it is argued,  the so-called "credibility vs. flexibility
trade-off", or better a long-run stability vs. short-run stabilization trade-
off, is either non-existent or is such that the benefits of credibility for
non-inflationary long-run growth  outweigh the costs of restrained
flexibility in the short-run stabilization task.2 This view favouring the
present institutional arrangement is often supplemented by the idea,
also put forward in some European Commission documents (e.g. Buti-
Sapir (1998)), that the EMU regime allows for a simple and
straightforward assignment rule between centralized monetary policy,
aimed at stabilizing union-wide shocks, and national fiscal policies,
                                               
1 These problems were  widely known and debated well before the inception of
the EMU: see e.g. the comprehensive analyses by Van der Ploeg (1991),
Goodhart-Smith (1993), Kenen (1995).
2For an overview of these arguments see Buti et al. (1998), Buti-Sapir (1999),
Artis-Winkler (1999).
7aimed at stabilizing their own domestic shocks (see also Dixit-
Lambertini (2001)).
The present state of assessment of economic policy and
institution design in the EMU also reflects a line of research that has
mostly focused on the assumption that the MA and the FAs may have
conflicting preferences and/or targets in the inflation-employment
dilemma. In particular, the FAs are typically portrayed as being less (or
no) inflation-averse and more (or totally) unemployment-averse relative
to the MA, and/or as having an output (employment) target greater than
the equilibrium potential output (employment). Assuming that policy
makers pursue their goals by means of aggregate demand instruments,
the policy game may result in macroeconomic equilibria which are sub-
optimal for the economy. Therefore, the EMU institutional design has
almost exclusively been assessed in its capacity to prevent the
distortions that may be created by "undisciplined" policy makers3. Only
recently has research started investigating how the EMU might
perform under the stabilization profile once all policy makers were
indeed "disciplined": examples are the papers by De Grauwe (2000),
Dixit and Lambertini (2001), Buti et al. (2001).   The question is
important beacuse the EMU is hopefully an enduring institution and in
the long run actors' preferences may evolve under the effect of a given
set of rules. If it is true that the an insititution like the SGP supports
macroeconomic equilibria that are Pareto superior to those that would
emerge under undisciplined behaviours of policy makers, one may
expect that in the long run everyone recognizes the superiority of the
disciplined behaviours in such a way that the undisciplined ones are
wiped out from the system. Will then that same institution still ensure
optimal macroeconomic equilibria?4
                                               
3Dixit (2001) and Dixit-Lambertini (2001) provide one of the most updated
treatment of the consequences of various combinations of preferences/targets
conflicts among policy makers in the EMU.
4Recent empirical studies on the so-called "monetary-fiscal policy mix" in
Europe in the last decades also suggest that the theoretical concentration on
targets/preferences conflicts between MAs and FAs may be debtor to the
8My purpose here is to contribute to this new point of view on
economic policy in the EMU by examining in particular whether in the
presence of disciplined policy makers the co-existence of one single MA
with many independent FAs and the simple rule assigning aggregate
stabilization to the MA and domestic stabilization to the FAs (under the
SGP constraint)  can indeed ensure optimal stabilization for  every
member country. My analysis of the stabilization problem is organized
as follows.
Section 2 presents an AD-LM-AS model of the EMU
characterized as a two-countries "inter-regional" monetary system: that
is, one with a single central bank but two independent FAs. Economies
are hit by random shocks producing real and nominal fluctuations
around potential output with a given rate of structural unemployment.
With regard to the treatment of shocks, following recent works by De
Grauwe (2000),  Cooper-Kempf (2000), Dixit (2001), Dixit-Lambertini
(2001), the model goes beyond the traditional dichotomy between
symmetric shocks (uniform for all countries) and asymmetric shocks (in
one single country) and  uses  the degree of correlation of shocks across
countries as the discriminating parameter. Only demand-side shocks
are considered: in fact, these shocks rule out any policy dilemma and
allow  examination of whether the EMU institutional framework
                                                                                                                       
particular historical experience across the end of the 1970s and the beginning
of the 1980s. The evidence examined by Melitz (1997), Wyplosz (1999), Hughes
Hallet et al. (2000) supports the view that the two policy arms have most of the
time been used as "strategic substitutes", that is to say, both have concurred to
the same counter-cyclical goals with one instrument being relaxed while the
other was tightened (see also Buti et al. (2001) for a discussion of these works).
Farina and Tamborini (2001) compute a measure of structural changes in the
fiscal stance of the EU countries and show that a conflict of policy stance with
the MAs probably arose between the second oil shock and the advent of the
EMS, whereas the FAs returned to fiscal discipline as early as the mid-1980s.
According to Farina and Tamborini (but see also De Grauwe (1999)), in general
the monetary stance in the EU countries failed to recognize the change in the
fiscal stance creating severe or prohibitive conditions for fiscal consolidation.
As confirmed in a recent study by the European Commission (2000), the
relaxation of monetary conditions took place only at the beginning of the 1990s.
9enables solution of the stabilization problem first of all at its pure
"technical" level (in the sense that will be clarified below)5. Consistently
with this aim, the model displays a richer structure than is usually
found in models focused on policy dilemmas and preferences of policy-
makers. This feature will turn out to be valuable in the analysis of the
mechanisms that transmit shocks and policy measures across EMU
members, the so-called "spillover effects", that play a major role in the
debate on the pros and cons of the present insitutional framework but
are often modelled poorly.
Section 3 examines the stabilization problem in the EMU amid
centralized monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policies in relation
to different degrees of correlation of shocks across countries. As
explained above, I assume that all policy makers are disciplined
according to the rules established by the EMU treaties and pacts. This
may be called a pure stabilization regime, where the central MA and the
national FAs i) share the same model of the economy and the same
targets of inflation and potential output, ii) wish to minimize deviations
from target values of inflation and output with no "inflation bias" in
their objectives functions (they abstain from using macroeconomic
policies intended to manipulate the long-run equilibrium levels of
inflation, output and unemployment). Can the EMU members be
sufficiently sheltered against macroeconomic fluctuations in this ideal
regime? As we shall see, having disciplined policy-makers does not
exahust the problem of policy design, for the further problem of the
efficient choice and assignment of stabilization instruments  has still to
be addressed. To this  end, it will be necessary to revive the traditional
approach to the normative analysis of economic policy − associated with
Tinbergen and Meade − centred on the principle of efficiency of policy
instruments. As is well known, in this approach the key to efficiency is
the criterion of optimal assignment  − which has inexplicably gone
astray in the current debate on the EMU. It consists of two
requirements: i) a number of instruments equal to the number of
                                               
5 It may also be added that demand shocks are in practice just as important as
supply shocks and, according to various studies, more significant and frequent.
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objectives, and ii) each instrument  being assigned to an objective in
such a way that the cost-effect balance in the use of the instrument is
optimal.
In the light of this analysis, the popular idea  of assigning
common shocks to centralized monetary policy and domestic shocks to
decentralized fiscal policies turns out to be overly simplistic. It will be
seen that there is indeed a matter of choice of the optimal stabilizer,
which depends on the interplay between i) the nature and extent of the
spillover effects, and ii) the degree of correlation of shocks across
countries. There may be conditions such that centralized monetary
policy is not the most efficient instrument even for symmetric shocks;
and other conditions may exist such that national FAs are forced to
stabilize asymmetric shocks when fiscal policy is not the most efficient
instrument. Inefficiency typically implies "excessive" use of the
instrument. Thus, paradoxically, unduly large budget swings may
emerge as a by-product of an institutional design aimed at minimizing
fiscal activism. The consequences of this result are also discussed in
consideration of the role of the SGP.
Section 4 summarizes the paper and puts forward its main
conclusions.
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In order to examine the EMU in its stabilization capacity, we
shall proceed on the basis of a theoretical approach whose main
ingredients can be summarized as follows. i) The real variables of the
economy (output and employment) fluctuate in response to demand
disturbances which for the sake of simplicity are treated as exogenous
random shocks. ii) Fluctuations take place around a long-period level of
domestic output ("potential output") corresponding to full use of the
factors net of any "structural unemployment". iii) The economic system
responds to shocks with variations in quantities and not only in prices
because of imperfections in the organization of the labour market.  iv)
Neither fiscal nor monetary interventions on aggregate demand are able
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to alter the level of potential output and the structural rate of
unemployment permanently, but they can minimize fluctuations and
their real costs.
These building blocks are generally assembled in models of the
so-called AD-LM-AS type6.  Characterizing EMU features are also
added, as explained in the subsequent paragraphs of the section.
2.1. The model
The model depicts the EMU as an open system consisting of two
countries with the following characteristics:
• production of a single good, either consumed or exported, which
differs in each of the two countries; the good may be exported intra-
EMU or extra-EMU;
• capital mobility;
• absence of labour mobility;
• structural symmetry
• one national FA for each country;
• one MA for the EMU.
The rest of the world (ROW) is not specified except for the
following characteristics in relation  to the EMU:
• mobility of commodities and capital;
• absence of labour mobility;
• free floating currency regime.
                                               
6This class of models has  been  widely used by current research on
stabilization policies in exchange-rate systems and currency unions. See in
particular Eichengreen-Wyplosz (1993), Allsopp-Vines (1996, 1998), Allsopp et
al. (1999), De Grauwe (2000), Dixit-Lambertini (2001) to mention only a few.
Earlier versions of the present model have appeared in Tamborini (2001) and
Farina-Tamborini (2001).
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Definitions
All the variables are defined in logarithms (unless stated otherwise) and
they represent stochastic deviations from long-period equilibrium values
in the EMU7. The full list of variables is  given  in Appendix A1.
The EMU countries
The following equations (i = 1, 2, j ≠ i) are given for each EMU country.
Aggregate demand
(2.1) yi = − yqqi + yzzj − yr(ri − pie) − gi +  δi
which depends on (changes in)
− intra-EMU and extra-EMU foreign trade in function of the domestic
terms of trade, yqqi, of the other EMU country’s output, yzzj, and of
world demand shocks included in δi
− consumption and investment dependent on the domestic real rate of
interest, yr(ri − pie)
− government non-structural budget, gi
− exogenous shocks δi
Terms of trade (effective real exchange rate)
(2.2) qi = α(pii − pij) + (1 − α)(pii − (x + piw))
which is calculated as the weighted average of the intra-EMU terms of
trade, pii − pij, and the extra-EMU terms of trade,  pii − (x + piw), where α
is the weight of intra-EMU trade.
                                               
7For details on this technique see also Allsopp-Vines (1996, 1998).
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Aggregate supply
(2.3) zi = zpi(pii − pie)
.which reflects the labour market regime.  A given amount of ‘structural
unemployment’ (e.g. positive NAIRU) is assumed, thogether with a
degree of nominal wage stickiness in case of unexpected changes in the
inflation rate, zpi > 0. With no loss of generality, it is convenient to  set zpi
= 1. Consequently, output and employment increase (decrease) with
respect to the long-run equilibrium (potential output) in the presence of
unexpected domestic inflation (deflation)8.
Money demand
(2.4) mdi = pii + mzzi − mrri + λi
which depends on (changes in)
− domestic price level, pii
− output, mzzi
− rate of interest on bonds, mrr
− exogenous shocks, λi
Domestic money stock
(2.5) mi = − yqα(pii − pij) + yz(zj − zi) + mθθi + µi
 In the absence of an independent MA, each individual country has only
two channels of money creation: its intra-EMU balance of payments9,
                                               
8It is therefore also assumed that, in long-period equilibrium conditions, there
is a uniform inflation rate, zero or otherwise, in the EMU countries. This
condition does not conflict with the productive specialization of the countries
(for which the equilibrium price level is not the same), in that it implies that
relative prices remain constant.
9 Strictly speaking, each country also has the channel of the extra-EMU
balance of payments. In order to make the model more compact and
manageable, we assume that the reserves in extra-EMU currencies are entirely
14
which redistributes a given EMU money stock, and the bank channel
(i.e. the domestic banks' borrowing  from the ECB) which has a
counterpart in the EMU money stock. Overall, the determinants of mi
are:
− intra-EMU foreign trade, which depends on the intra-EMU term of
trade, yqα(pii − pij) (see equation 0 above) and on the other country’s
output, yzzj, net of the imports induced by domestic activity, yzzi;
− net intra-EMU capital movements in function of the interest
differential on domestic bonds, mθθi
− exogenous shocks including the domestic banks' borrowing from the
ECB, µi.
As far as capital movements are concerned, I assume complete financial
integration: all EMU bonds are perfect substitutes and in equilibrium
pay the same interest, mθ → ∞.  Hence θi = 0, ri = r.
Equilibrium of the output market
(2.6) yi = zi
Equilibrium of the domestic market
(2.7) mdi = mi
                                                                                                                       
centralized at the ECB, so that imbalances in a country’s extra-EMU payments
do not have effects on the domestic money stock.
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The Union
The following conditions must hold for the EMU as a whole.
Equilibrium of the money market:
(2.8) (Σmdi − m) + (Σλi − Σ(−gi)) = 0
Monetary equilibrium is expressed in relation to financial general
equilibrium (Walras law), where the demand for bonds is represented as
a shock to the domestic demand for money of each country vis-à-vis the
supply of bonds, which is equal to aggregate fiscal deficits.10 Given the
bonds market equilibrium, equilibrium of the money market requires
(2.9) 2pi + mzz − 2mrr = m + Σgi
Note that the EMU money market equilibrium, Σmdi = m, and domestic
money markets equilibria, mdi = mi, in their turn entail the condition
    Σmi = m
i.e. that the aggregate change in domestic money stocks must coincide
with change in the EMU money supply. But, as explained above, Σmi is
given by the sum of intra-EMU balances of payments and by the sum of
banks' borrowing  from the ECB, µi. The sum of intra-EMU balances
must be nil by construction, which entails:
     Σµi = m
i.e. additional money is injected into the economies through their bank
channels.
Uncovered real interest parity
(2.10)     x = rw − r + xe
                                               
10We consider gi to be a net addition to both domestic demand and  financial
wealth. To the extent that gi is strictly understood as a temporary deviation
from the balanced budget, this is also consistent with the Barro-Ricardo
approach.
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The euro exchange rate must be constantly aligned to uncovered
interest parity with respect to the ROW. There is therefore appreciation
x < 0 (depreciation, x > 0) if, ceteris paribus,
−  the world interest rate decreases (increases), rw <> 0;
−  the EMU interest rate  increases (decreases), , r >< 0;
−  the euro is expected to appreciate (depreciate), xe <> 0.
Let us assume that exchange rate expectations are led by the expected
inflation differential between EMU and ROW;11 that is,
xe = pie − piew
Substituting this relation in the previous one, we obtain the uncovered
real interest parity:
(2.11) x = (rw− piew) − (r − pie).
To sum up, the model has:
• three exogenous variables determined by the  EMU policy-makers:
gi, m
• two exogenous variables determined by the ROW:
rw, piw
• three exogenous shock variables for each EMU country:
δi, λi, µi
Equations 0-0 for each country, and 0 for the EMU, determine
• three endogenous variables, respectively:
pii,  r
                                               
11 This assumption, of course, does not necessarily entail purchasing power
parity, which in this model would conflict with the productive specialization
attributed to each country. However, if the relative price between the EMU
‘good’ (the basket of goods produced by each EMU country) and that of the
ROW is also included among the long-period equilibrium conditions, deviations
from this equilibrium due to the inflation differential should be off-set by the
exchange rate.
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from which one obtains the further endogenous variables
zi, qi, pi, z, x.
A characterization of shocks
Empirical as well as theoretical studies of the EMU pay close
attention to the nature, magnitude and correlation of macroeconomic
fluctuations across countries. In fact, these features significantly affect
the optimum choice of stabilization policies. It is now customary to
distinguish between symmetric shocks (which affect all countries to
same extent) or asymmetric shocks (which affect one single country).
Yet if fluctuations are modelled as linear stochastic shocks, it seems
more accurate to consider the correlation of shocks across countries. In
fact, in countries with close interrelations, macroeconomic fluctuations
generally arise in distributed form, with different degrees of intensity.
Recent works by De Grauwe (2000),  Cooper-Kempf (2000), Dixit (2001),
Dixit-Lambertini (2001), make use of the correlation coefficient of
shocks in the various countries. This enables compact treatment of
various hypotheses on the correlation of fluctuations which are more
general than the two extreme cases. In particular, this formalization
enables treatment of a case that may be of importance in Europe but
has not received adequate attention: bilateral shocks due to intra-EMU
trade (a shift of demand from one country to another)12.
If var(δi) is the variance of demand shocks in country i, and
cov(δiδj) is the covariance of shocks in two countries, then




 δδ
δδ
=ρ
                                               
12 For a model focussed on bilateral demand shocks, and  for discussion of their
importance in the EMU, see Tamborini (2001).
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is the correlation coefficient of the shocks. Therefore, in the case of two
countries, we may say that if we observe δ1, we may expect, up to some
random error,
(2.12)       δ2 = ρδ1
We may thus characterize three cases in terms of correlation:
• ρ = 1, symmetric shocks (e.g. fall in world demand), δ1 = δ2 = δ
• ρ = 0,  unilateral shocks (e.g. fall in domestic consumption), δ1 ≠ 0, δ2
= 0
• ρ = −1, bilateral shocks (e.g. redistribution of intra-EMU trade), δ2 =
− δ1
Note that I shall use the generic term "asymmetric shocks" for any ρ <
1, i.e. shocks that hit all countries but with unequal intensity.
2.2. A first general view
To explore the model's properties, let us begin with the solutions
of the endogenous variables (pii, zi) for a single country i, with all the
other variables taken as given. Assuming rational inflation
expectations, which can be shown to be pie = E(pi) = 013, we obtain:
(2.13) pii = [−gi  + α(yqpij + yzzj) − yrqr + δi][1 + yq]−1
(2.14) zi = pii
with
(2.15) r = pi/mr + [mzz − Σgi − m]/2mr
(2.16) x = −r
yrq ≡ yr + yq(1 − α)
Domestic fluctuations of inflation and output in each country (pii,
zi) depend on three channels of influence  by macroeconomic variables
                                               
13For a formal proof see Appendix A.2.
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(the signs of the effects of the relevant variables are obvious and do not
require particular explanation):
• the domestic channel represented by the fiscal component gi and
exogenous shocks, δi
• the trade channel activated by the other country’s inflation and
output, pij, zj, via intra-EMU trade as measured by the weight α
• the financial channel related to the common real interest rate; the
real interest rate produces a compound effect on aggregate demand,
yrq ≡ yr + yq(1−α)¸ where yr measures the effect on the interest-
sensitive domestic demand, and yq(1−α) measures that on the euro-
sensitive foreign demand via the uncovered interest-parity linkage
of the euro rate with the real exchange rate14.
Therefore, the crucial aspect of the economic system represented
by equations 0-0 is the interdependence between countries created by the
trade and financial channels. The trade channel is the best known and
most thoroughly studied form of macroeconomic  interdependence
among open economies, its prototype being the Keynesian international
trade multiplier. Consequently, although trade interdependence is a
phenomenon of great importance for the European economies, it is not
specific to membership in the EMU – except for the fact that it now
hinges on irrevocably fixed exchange rates among member countries.
The distinctive feature of the move into an inter-regional monetary
regime is exposure to the financial channel of interdependence. The
primary reason for this is the creation of a single money market and of a
single MA, which centralizes the determination of the interest and
exchange rates. The single money market collects the impulses from
                                               
14The aggregate-demand effect measured by yrq  is clearly analogous to the one
present in the traditional Mundell-Fleming open economy analysis. The main
difference here is that whereas the traditional Mundell-Fleming open economy
operates either in a fixed exchange-rate regime (α = 1) or in a flexible
exchange-rate regime (α = 0), our EMU economies  operate? in a mixed regime
which is of the first type by the amount of intra-EMU trade 0 < α < 1, and of
the second type by the amount of extra-EMU trade (1 − α). The magnitude of
yrq  is modified accordingly.
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individual countries and transmits them back in the form of changes in
the common interest and exchange rates15.
Now let us examine the two countries simultaneously. By means
of  equations (2.14)-0, and the measure of correlation given by 0, taking
a shock δ1 to country 1 as benchmark,  we obtain the following reduced-
form equations for inflation rates:
(2.17) pi1 = ∆1g1 + ∆2g2 + ∆3m + (∆4+∆5ρ)δ1
(2.18) pi2 = ∆2g1 + ∆1g2 + ∆3m  + (∆4ρ+∆5)δ1
(2.19) pi = (pi1 + pi2)/2
∆1 ?, ∆2 ?, ∆3 > 0, ∆4 > 0, ∆5 > 0 (these coefficients are not explicited
since their complete expressions are inessential).
These equations highlight two main issues.
The diffusion of shocks
Fluctuations (nominal and real) in each country depend on local
shocks as well as on their degree of correlation ρ with concomitant
shocks in the other country. Interdependence channels spread local
shocks throughout the EMU. The domestic impact of domestic shocks is
measured by ∆4, whereas ∆5 measures the imported impact of shocks
abroad. If a country is hit by a unilateral shock, e.g. country 1 (with ρ =
0), the other country is also affected  via the various interdependence
                                               
15It might be objected that financial interdependence may also exist in an
international regime with fixed exchange rates and complete financial
integration,  and that it was already in force among the EMS member-
countries. This objection is correct; nonetheless, moving into an inter-regional
regime entails a difference of degree, albeit not of substance, in financial
interdependence. In the light of the EMS experience, it should be borne in mind
that an international regime has two major differences from an inter-regional
one. The first is the presence of formally independent MAs, which means that
compensatory domestic monetary policies might be implemented; the second is
that bilateral exchange-rate realignments are possible.
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channels discussed above. In the event of asymmetric shocks (ρ < 1),
both countries are hit to different extents and "export” some of the shock
to each other. Finally, if the shock is symmetric (ρ = 1), both countries
are hit  to the same extent, measured by ∆4, with full reciprocal "export"
of the shock, measured by ∆5, so that they eventually  undergo the same
overall impact given by ∆4 + ∆5. Thus the model captures one  of the
most important features of interdependent economies, namely that
interdependence triggers shock-amplifying mechanisms.
The anatomy of fiscal spillovers
Economic activity in each country may also be influenced by
domestic as well as foreign budget variations (g1, g2) for any given
monetary policy choice m by the ECB. The coefficient ∆3 measures the
impact of changes in money supply on each economy and on the EMU
inflation rate: it is positive as expected. The coefficients ∆1 and ∆2
measure the domestic impact of, respectively, domestic and foreign
budget variations − the latter  are generally known as "fiscal spillovers"
in  EMU jargon. Both fiscal coefficients have ambiguous signs. Hence,
we cannot establish a priori whether, say, a fiscal expansion gi < 0 in
one country stimulates or depresses economic activity domestically as
well as abroad. The internal and external effects of fiscal policies are a
crucial issue for stabilization in a currency union16. The present model
can shed some light on some controversial points.
As explained above, any budgetary variation in one country (gi ≠
0), activates domestic as well as union-wide macroeconomic effects
through three channels: the domestic channel (the direct impact of the
budget on domestic demand), the trade channel (via the relationship
between domestic economic activity and intra-EMU trade), the financial
channel (via the relationship between the budget imbalance, the
common interest and euro rates and their feedback onto aggregate
                                               
16Thorough analyses can be found in Van der Ploeg (1991), Goodhart-Smith
(1993), Masson-Taylor (1993), Buiter et al. (1993), Kenen (1995, ch.4),
Bayoumi-Eichengreen (1995), Eichengreen-Wyplosz (1998).
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demand). The coefficients ∆1 and ∆2 reflect the balance of  strength
among  these channels: ∆1 < 0 means that the domestic channel is
stronger than the financial channel, so that budget variations have
domestic "Keynesian" effects; they have "non-Keynesian" effects in the
opposite case. A value ∆2 < 0 means that the trade channel is stronger
than the financial channel, so that budget variations abroad exert a
positive fiscal spillover with "Keynesian" effects domestically; they
produce a negative fiscal spillover with "non-Keynesian" effects in the
opposite case17.
Inspection of the coefficients ∆1 and ∆2 reveals that their sign
depends on the relative weight of the parameters yrq, measuring the
aggregate-demand effect in each country of changes in the common
interest rate, and mr, determining money-bond substitutability and
hence the impact of national budget imbalances on the common interest
rate18. These two parameters rule the financial channel of
interdependence, which is stronger as yrq is larger and mr is smaller.
There exist two critical values of the yrq/mr ratio beyond which
∆1 and ∆2 turn out to be positive, i.e. determine non-Keynesian effects of
                                               
17After the works by Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997), and the ensuing
literature on short-term and long-term macroeconomic effects of fiscal policies,
it is now customary to call the expansionary or contractionary effects of budget
deficits "Keynesian" or "non-Keynesian" (and vice versa for surpluses). These
works and the related literature often employ different models with explicit
microfoundations, and focus more on structural budget policies than on cyclical
ones. On the other hand, more sophistication at the microeconomic level often
comes at the expense of oversimplification of the macroeconomic frameworks:
the most significant among these works consider individual countries in
isolation, or ignore the concomitant monetary stance (see e.g. De Grauwe
(1999) and Eichengreen (1998) for these observations). In any case,  I borrow
the terminology  of this literature just for its emphasis on the reversal of the
effects of fiscal policies.
18In fact,
sign(∆1) = sign(yrq(2yq + yz − mz) − 2mr(1 + yq))
sign(∆2) = sign(yrq(2(1 + yq) + yz + mz) − 2mr(yz + yq))
where 2 is the number of countries in the system.
23
budget variations. The critical value beyond which ∆1 > 0, say
(yrq/mr)1, is greater than the one beyond which ∆2 > 0, say (yrq/mr)2.
Note in particular that  (yrq/mr)1 > 1, (yrq/mr)2 < 1. Consequently,
there emerge three different regimes determining the macroeconomic
effects, internal and external, of budget variations. They are
summarized in the following table.
Table 1. Regimes of fiscal effects
(yrq/mr) < (yrq/mr)2 (yrq/mr)1 < (yrq/mr) <
(yrq/mr)2
(yrq/mr) > (yrq/mr)2
∆1 < 0, ∆2 < 0
EMU Keynesian
effects
∆1 < 0, ∆2 > 0
SGP hypothesis
∆1 > 0, ∆2 > 0
EMU non-Keynesian
effects
  In the first regime (first column) budget variations in one
country exert Keynesian effects, whereas in the third regime they exert
non-Keynesian effects, in the EMU as a whole. The mid-regime
combines a Keynesian effect in the originating country  with a non-
Keynesian one in the other. I call this the "SGP hypothesis" since it
figures prominently among the arguments in favour of binding fiscal
rules for national FAs (see e.g. Buiter et al. (1993), Eichengreen-
Wyplosz (1998), Artis-Winkler (1999)). On the one hand, the argument
runs, each government has an incentive to seize the domestic positive
effects of budget deficits. On the other, if the financial effects of fiscal
imbalances are large, a net negative fiscal spillover may emerge abroad,
with a budget deficit in one country exporting a recession in the others.
Hence, unfettered budget policies of individual member countries may
hurt other  members. Table 1 shows that this peculiar SGP hypothesis
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is possible within a limited range of parameter values19. Clearly, in the
other regimes the problem underlying the SGP vanishes: in the first
regime a budget deficit in one country may also stimulate economic
activity in the others, whereas in the third regime no government would
ever be tempted to run excessive budget deficits.
The model also points out two factors that may limit the strength
of the financial channel of interdependence and hence the extent of
negative fiscal spillovers in a currency union. The first concerns the
parameter yrq itself. Since yrq ≡ yr + yq(1−α)¸ where (1−α) is the share of
flexible-rate extra-EMU trade, yrq is smaller for a country that moves
from a flexible exchange-rate regime (where α = 0) into the EMU (where
α > 0). It is also a well-known fact that intra-EMU trade takes a large
share of almost all members' international exchanges. The second factor
relates to interest rate determination. As shown by equation 0, where
the summation of gi's appears, the impact of a single government's
borrowing requirement on the interest rate in a currency union is
diluted thanks to the increased market dimension. Moreover,
completion of financial integration and participation in a single money
market may enhance money-bond substitutability, raise the value of mr
and lower that of the yrq/mr ratio.  To be sure, these same factors are
often mentioned as possible incentives to budget laxity for individual
countries joining the EMU, but it also true that the lower the yrq/mr
ratio in each country, the less likely  becomes the danger of negative
fiscal spillovers for the EMU as a whole.
I do not conclude that negative fiscal spillovers will be a minor
problem in the EMU and that fears about this problem are groundless. I
contend instead that,  though critical for fiscal policy conduct in a
currency union, this issue is largely empirical in nature, that it deserves
                                               
19A (perhaps more realistic) alternative is that the yrq/mr ratio may  differ in
different countries (being small in deficit-prone countries and large in the
others). But in this case the problem with the SGP is that setting equal rules
for different countries is not efficient (see e.g. Eichengreen-Wyplosz (1998)).
The relationship between the yrq/mr ratio and the deficit rules in the SGP will
also be clarified in the next section.
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further accurate investigation, and that it can hardly be settled
definitively for all countries and in all circumstances20. As the model
shows, this  specific aspect of interdependence in a currency union
should be framed within an extended analysis of aspects concerning the
transmission mechanism of macroeconomic variables across the EMU,
institutional and operational relations between the ECB and the
national FAs, and in particular the reciprocal repercussions of their
economic policies. These aspects are dealt with in the subsequent parts
of this paper.
3. Efficiency of stabilization policies in the EMU
To sum up the preliminary results established in the previous
section, when the EMU economies are hit by domestic shocks with a
                                               
20The empirical literature has hitherto been inconclusive, not to mention the
facts that genuine data on the EMU are still lacking and that past experiences
cannot be translated mechanically into the new institutional and market
environment of the EMU. Masson and Taylor (1993) report that estimations
run with the IMF world model MULTIMOD support earlier Mundell-Fleming
conclusions that fiscal expansions in one country have positive effects on
economic activity abroad under a flexible exchange rate (e.g. the US-EEC case
in the 1980s) whereas they have negative effects abroad under a fixed exchange
rate (e.g. the Germany-EEC case in the 1990s). Using the same model, Hughes
Hallet and McAdam (1999) have simulated the process of convergence to
balanced budgets in the EMU, finding that domestic fiscal restrictions do not
stimulate partners' economic activity, and that a key variable in determining
the overall effect on economic activity is the concomitant monetary stance.
Allsopp et al. (1999), using the McKibbin-Sachs Global Economic Model
(MSG2), by contrast argue that collective fiscal consolidation forced by the SGP
is less costly than if individually undertaken,  because of the larger positive
financial effect of lower interest rate and euro rate depreciation. However  this
finding does not necessarily imply "non-Keynesian" fiscal spillovers across
countries. Eichengreen-Wyplosz (1998) present econometric estimations of an
AD-LM-AS model for OECD countries from 1955 to 1996 showing that
domestic fiscal coefficients are "Keynesian", whereas external effects are
negligible.
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certain degree of correlation, these have effects on domestic output and
prices, and therefore on EMU output and prices.  Consequently, also
involved are the common money market, the EMU interest rate and the
euro rate.  I now examine the stabilization problem faced by the policy
makers. In order to focus on the stabilization capacity of the EMU, let
us assume that all the policy makers, both central and national, pursue
pure stabilization; that is to say, i) they share the same model of the
economy and the same targets of inflation and potential output, ii) they
wish to minimize deviations from target values of inflation and output
with no "inflation bias" in their objective functions (they abstain from
using macroeconomic policies intended to manipulate the long-run
equilibrium levels of inflation, output and unemployment).  Moreover,
in the presence of demand shocks such that fluctuations in output are
positively correlated with those in prices, no policy dilemma arises since
stabilization of output and prices are always mutually compatible
regardless of the policy-makers' preferences21. Therefore, we can simply
assume that the target of each FA is pii = 0, and that the target of the
ECB is pi = 0. As we shall see, even in this ideal regime where all policy-
makers are disciplined and face no policy dilemmas, the stabilization
problem still presents a few pitfalls that have not been examined
carefully in the literature. These depend on three  factors highlighted by
equations 0-(2.18): i) the interdependence between countries, ii) the
degree of correlation of shocks ρ, iii) the "division of labour" among the
national fiscal instruments gi  and the central monetary one m.
The first  question that naturally arises in the face of a shock is:
who should stabilize? Note immediately that only two of the target
equations 0-(2.18) are linearly independent; since there are three policy
instruments in the system (m, g1, g2), one instrument is redundant.
                                               
21For a formal proof see Appendix A.2. A related analytical advantage is that
in this context it is unnecessary to specify what the policy-makers’ preferences
are.
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Hence there can only be two alternative answers to the previous
question: either the ECB or the two national FAs22.
Let us first examine the ECB. It has one instrument, the money
supply m, and one target, the EMU inflation rate pi, whereas the
national targets are two. By setting pi = 0, gi = 0, and solving for m we
obtain:
(3.1) m* = −[mr(1+ρ)/2yrq]δ1
(3.2) pi1 = (1 − ρ)[2(1+ 2yq + yz)]−1δ1
(3.3) pi2 = −(1 − ρ)[2(1+ 2yq + yz)]−1δ1
Clearly, pii ≠ 0 for ρ ≠ 1, i.e. national economies are under-
stabilized, and their degree of stabilization is an increasing function of
the correlation of shocks ρ. The basic reason is that the ECB gears
money supply to  stabilization of the EMU aggregates, not necessarily of
their country components. Therefore, our first conclusion is summarized
in the following proposition
(P1) Stabilization assigned to centralized monetary policy is always
effective for the EMU as a whole, but it cannot be effective for all
countries unless a symmetric shock occurs (ρ = 1).
This result replicates those of De Grauwe (2000) and Cooper and
Kempf (2000) who obtain it for supply-side shocks. De Grauwe relates
this result to the interplay between asymmetric shocks and a
"representative" ECB's reaction function interpreted as the weighted
average of national preferences. Cooper and Kempf obtain it in a
traditional context of conflicting targets among policy makers. As is
clarified above, the reason behind (P1) is more basic: the lack of
instruments vis-à-vis objectives when aysmmetric shocks occur. By
contrast, Dixit and Labertini (2001) conclude that in a pure stabilization
regime − which they call "monetary-fiscal symbiosis" − centralized
monetary policy is always fully stabilizing for both the EMU as a whole
                                               
22The case of the ECB and one FA can be excluded because it would give rise to
a problem of “country specificity” against the ECB intervention.
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and for each country for any kind of shock. The main reason is that in
their model all countries always have the same EMU inflation rate;
hence no problem of incomplete stabilization can ever arise no matter
what stabilization policy is chosen. Yet continuous inflation alignment
across EMU members is a strong (counterfactual) assumption as far as
cyclical fluctuations are concerned. By contrast, proposition (P1) makes
it necessary to distinguish the two scenarios of symmetric and
asymmetric shocks.
3.1. Symmetric shocks
As far as symmetric shocks are concerned, (P1) seems to be in
line with the conventional wisdom: symmetric shocks should be
stabilized by the ECB, and the centralized monetary policy may fit all.
Yet the alternative assignment to decentralized fiscal stabilization is
equally possible. In fact, the national FAs have one instrument, the
budget adjustments gi, and one target, the national inflation rate pii,
each. Consequently, there always exists a vector of fiscal instruments
that completely stabilizes all the economies and the EMU. By setting pii
= 0, m = 0, in equations 0-(2.18) with ρ = 1 and solving for gi,  we obtain
(3.4) g*1 = g*2 = [mr/(mr − yrq)]δ1
Should we conclude that in the case of symmetric shocks we are
indifferent between monetary and fiscal stabilization? Probably not, as
the principle of optimal assignment suggests. Notably, most current
analyses of stabilization policies in the EMU do not address this issue.
Let us compare compare the fiscal full-stabilization solution (3.4)
with the monetary one provided by equation (3.1) under a symmetric
shock
(3.5) m* = −[mr/yrq]δ1
As is well known, in the early Tinbergen-Meade approach, efficient
assignment requires that for any target variation dy, the instrument xi
that has to be assigned to y should satisfy
min(|∂xi/∂y|,  |∂xj/∂y|,  ...)
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Implicit in this assignment principle are considerations on the “cost of
the instrument”. Friedman’s famous warning against the “long and
variable lags” of policy interventions were of similar nature. More up-to-
date considerations, more relevant to stochastic environments, focus on
how much of the variability of shocks is transmitted to policy variables.
For example, recent studies on the conduct of monetary policy in
industrialized countries (e.g. Clarida et al. (1999)) highlight the
preference of central bankers for smooth changes in interest rates.
Today’s commitment to “price stability” may be extended to asset prices
and the exchange rate. In the present model, both monetary and fiscal
instruments have repercussions on the EMU interest rate and the euro
rate. Using equation 0 we can compute how much variability is
transmitted to the interest rate by the two alternative policies. Denoting
with σ2δ the variance of the shocks, and with σ2r|•  the variance of the
interest rate conditional on one policy instrument, we obtain
σ2r|g*i = σ2δ/(mr − yrq)2
σ2r|m* = σ2δ/y2rq
In this view, the choice of the stabilization instrument should
follow from a minimum variance criterion23. Hence, the following
second proposition holds:
(P2) Under symmetric shocks either central monetary stabilization or
decentralized fiscal stabilization are effective. According to the
minumum variance criterion, central monetary stabilization is more
efficient  if σ2r|m* < σ2r|g*i , or yrq /mr > 1/2.
The condition identified in (P2) is, unsurprisingly, dependent on
the yrq /mr ratio  discussed in section 2 in relation to the financial
effects of budget imbalances. For the same reason, it is also akin to the
well-known Mundell-Fleming assignment solution in an open economy
                                               
23Of course, this criterion is only one among many others and is adopted here
just for expository purposes. It can easily be checked from equations (3.4) and
(3.5) that the early criterion of the "minimum use" of the instrument would
yield the same result.
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with flexible exchange rate. In fact, under symmetric shocks (in a pure
stabilization regime) all national FAs behave identically as if there were
a single centralized FA, and the yrq /mr ratio operates as the Mundell-
Fleming open-economy crowding-out parameter (reduced by the share of
fixed-rate intra-EMU trade). Consider a negative shock. By raising the
EMU interest rate and appreciating the euro rate, an equal fiscal
expansion by all governments feeds some crowding-out effect in all the
economies. If this effect is large, the overall extent of fiscal stabilization
should also be larger, and hence the variability of the interest rate turns
out to be greater than in the case of monetary stabilization. It also
follows that the argument that national fiscal restraints are necessary
because negative fiscal spillovers in the EMU are large is consistent
with efficient assignment of stabilization to centralized monetary policy
in the event of symmetric shocks.
3.2. Asymmetric shocks
We have seen that in case of asymmetric shocks full stabilization
for every country cannot be achieved by centralized monetary policy.
Consequently, a third proposition follows:
(P3) In the event of asymmetric shocks (ρ < 1), decentralized fiscal
stabilization is the only assignment consistent with full stabilization.
 Referring back to the inflation equations 0-(2.18), in
consideration of the fiscal spillovers between the two countries
discussed in section 2, the decentralized stabilization problem can
generally be treated in game-theoretic form. A large body of literature
has been produced  on comparing co-ordinated with unco-ordinated
fiscal stabilization policies among interdependent economies. Generally,
unco-ordinated policies in the presence of asymmetric shocks and fiscal
spillovers are viewed as being inferior to co-ordinated policies, with
positive fiscal spillovers inducing under-stabilization and negative fiscal
spillovers incentivating excess deficits (e.g. van der Ploeg (1991),
Goodhart-Smith (1993)). Hence those who foresee the  former type of
fiscal spillover in the EMU warn that decentralized fiscal stabilization
may be insufficient, whereas those who are concerned with the latter
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type have urged the introduction of budget constraints (see e.g  Artis-
Winkler (1999)). Yet the majority of recent analyses  start from the
existence of conflicting interests among national FAs or with the central
bank, and/or of some "cost of the instrument" in the use of budget
adjustments (see e.g. Buti et al. (2001)). Here the problem can be re-
examined in a disciplined system, where policy makers have no
conflicting objectives and the cost of budget adjustments may be
considered zero up to the SGP deficit ceiling. In this same framework,
Dixit and Lambertini (2001) argue that national FAs can always
achieve full stabilization  whether they co-ordinate or not; however, as
noted above, their model does not examine decentralized fiscal
stabilization from the efficiency point of view.
In the first place, let us study the unco-ordinated (Nash)
equilibrium of the game, where each FA chooses gi in relation to its own
national target, taking the FA's choice as given. Under the assumption
that pii = 0 is the target for all FAs, given ρ < 1 and m = 0, the two FAs'
reaction functions are reproduced in figure 1. The two functions have
the same slope (−∆2/∆1), whose sign depends on the prevailing regime of
fiscal effects among those in table 1. Figure 1 reproduces the two most
representative regimes: the one with EMU Keynesian effects, which
implies −∆2/∆1 < 0, and the SGP hypothesis, which implies  −∆2/∆1 > 0.
Figure 1. Fiscal reaction functions and unco-ordinated (Nash)
equilibria
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After a shock (δ1, ρδ1) in the two countries, the unco-ordinated
optimal budget adjustments are, respectively,
(3.6) g*1 =  [2mr − yrq (1−ρ)][2(mr − yrq)]−1δ1
(3.7) g*2 = [2mrρ + yrq(1−ρ)][2(mr − yrq)]−1δ1
This outcome prompts some important considerations  related to the
discussion on fiscal spillovers in section 2.
1) The signs of the optimal budget adjustments are ambiguous in
both countries. Once again, we have to examine the yrq /mr ratio, and
we see that, as far as ρ > 0,  yrq / mr < 1  is a sufficient condition for (g*1,
g*2) to have the same sign as δ1, i.e. for optimal budget adjustments to
be anti-cyclical as traditionally expected. Under these conditions  no
difference is to be expected from moving from unco-ordinated to c
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ordinated policy choices, the reason being that all governments share
the same objective function24.
2) Two particular cases are worth noting. The first is a unilateral
shock, e.g. in country 1, δ1 < 0, ρ = 0:  the result is  (g*1, g*2) < 0. Note
that country 2 should also run a budget deficit just in order to
compensate for the imported shock, thereby contributing itself to the
overall pressure on the interest rate.  The second case is a bilateral
trade shift from country 1 to country 2, δ1 < 0, ρ = −1: the result is  g*1 =
δ1, g*2 = −δ1, i.e. the two countries should exactly offset the change in
aggregate demand with an equal budgetary compensation of opposite
sign. Consequently, the aggregate borrowing requirement is balanced,
and hence no negative financial spillover arises.
We can therefore put forward the following fourth proposition
(P4) In the event of asymmeteric shocks of any degree, and for any sign of
fiscal spillovers, if all national FAs consistently pursue the same
objective of full stabilization, the unco-ordinated (Nash) equilibrium of
their budget choices always achieves both domestic and EMU
stabilization.
This conclusion is in line with Dixit and Lambertini's; however,
it should be qualified in consideration of the loss of efficiency of
decentralized fiscal policies in the presence of negative fiscal spillovers.
The condition yrq / mr < 1, as established in section 2, admits of both
fiscal regimes in figure 1. What is the main difference between the two?
It is the extent of budget adjustments. Figure 1  depicts a unilateral
negative shock to country 1 (δ1 < 0, ρ = 0): in both fiscal regimes, the
full-stabilization reaction function of government 1 (FS1) shifts
downward in the budget deficit region, while that of government 2 (FS2)
                                               
24In fact, as recalled by van der Ploeg, "international cooperation occurs,
firstly, through the international exchange of information, secondly, through
international harmonization of rules, and thirdly, through international
coordination of discretionary policies (1991, p.140). Each government pursuing
the same objective function independently corresponds to the second requisite
and is a substitute for the third.
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also shifts leftward in the deficit region by the amount of the imported
shock. Consistently with equations 0-(3.6), the Nash equilibrium shifts
from point A to point B  where (g*1, g*2) < 0 in both fiscal regimes. Yet
the absolute value of (g*1, g*2)  is different. It increases with ρ and with
the yrq /mr ratio. In fact, the former parameter determines the
diffusion of the negative shock in the EMU; the  latter determines the
extent of the crowding-out effect of budget deficits that should be
overcome. Therefore, the larger  the yrq /mr ratio, i.e. the more likely
the SGP hypothesis, the larger (more volatile) the optimal budget
responses should be in all countries, as a consequence of the fact that
decentralized fiscal stabilization loses efficiency also locally.
3.3. A note on the deficit ceiling in the Stability and Growth
Pact
From the previus conclusion there follows that the SGP
hypothesis, the assignment of asymmetric shocks to decentralized fiscal
stabilization and the imposition of budget constraints do not seem
mutually consistent. Under the SGP hypothesis, national FAs forced to
cope with  their own domestic shocks with an inefficient instrument
should be granted wider, not narrower, room for anti-cyclical fiscal
manoeuvre25. To see this more formally, let  g−i < 0 be the maximum
budget deficit compatible with the SGP ceiling for the given observed
GDP26; consequently, imposing g*i >  g−i and m = 0,  then
(3.8) 
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25The advice often offered to governments that they may keep their budget
slightly positive if they wish to insure themselves against unexpected need for
large deficits is extravagant,  for aiming at a structurally positive fiscal budget
may have distortionary effects which depress the level of potential output.
26The SGP ceiling may exceed the normal value of 3% of GDP under certified
conditions of mild or severe recession: see Buti et al. (1998) for detailed
treatment of these provisions.
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is the amplitude of the shock that each individual economy can ‘afford’
to accommodate locally without violating the SGP constraint. In
particular, (3.8) confirms that if the ECB does not intervene, and if all
governments stabilize locally, then |δi| decreases (the deficit ceiling is
more binding) as the yrq/mr ratio  grows larger.
A number of exercises and simulations have recently been
produced in order to assess the stringency of the SGP constraint (e.g.
Buti et al. (1997), Buti-Sapir (1998, chaps. 8-9), Eichengreen-Wyplosz
(1998)). These exercises have generally been run on the basis of country-
by-country historical data on cyclical slumps and budget responses, and
point to the conclusion that the SGP deficit ceiling will probably not be
a major impediment to stabilization. However, the institutional regime
shift represented by the EMU should be taken into account. Condition
(3.8) points out that, in a currency union like the EMU, calculation of
the margin of stabilization provided by the SGP cannot be performed by
taking the country concerned in isolation. Instead, such calculation
must take account of: i) the contemporaneous fiscal position of the other
countries in the union, ii) the concomitant monetary stance of the
central MA, iii) the correlation of the domestic shock with those in the
other member countries. Moreover, little attention has been paid to the
consequences of constrained fiscal stabilization.
The SGP deficit ceiling can be seen as a special case of  "cost of
the instrument" in policy choice-theoretic models. The general result in
these models is that when the marginal benefit of stabilization is
equated with the marginal cost of the instrument, the latter is used
more parsimoniously and hence under-stabilization is the outcome (see
e.g. Goodhart-Smith (1993), Buti et al. (2001)). Suppose for simplicity
that each government, in the case of negative shock,  chooses27
max(g*i, g−i)
                                               
27In this case the fiscal cost function is zero up to g−i and infinite elsewhere.
More precisely, in this interpretation g−i may be the maximal contingent deficit
below which no ECOFIN procedure is activated.
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Suppose also that after a shock the optimal deficit for one government
exceeds the ceiling, g*i < g−i, while for the other it does not. Then, the
former government is constrained to the g−i deficit. In the light of
equations 0-(2.18), there are three main consequences: i) the
constrained government under-stabilizes, ii) the unconstrained
government can still stabilize domestically by changing its optimal
budget choice, iii) the EMU as a whole  is under-stabilized.
These three consequences arise in both the fiscal regimes in
figure 1 . There is however a major difference as regards the
unconstrained government. Under the SGP hypothesis, the
unconstrained government will stabilize domestically by choosing a
smaller deficit (because the smaller deficit of the constrained
government exerts a smaller negative fiscal spillover), whereas in the
Keynesian regime the optimal deficit should be larger (because the
smaller deficit of the constrained government exerts a smaller positive
fiscal spillover)28. Therefore, if the SGP hypothesis is true, the deficit
ceiling, when it is binding, enforces the minimization of aggregate
deficits (which may be reckoned as a collective benefit) vis-à-vis under-
stabilization of the constrained country (which may be reckoned as a
private cost). If instead the SGP hypothesis turns out to be  untrue,
when the deficit ceiling is binding there will still be under-stabilization
of the constrained country but no, or negligible, reduction in aggregate
deficits. The welfare rationale of both outcomes is unclear, but none of
them is a Pareto improvement with respect to the Nash equilibrium of
unconstrained stabilization.
                                               
28The analogous result that stabilization in only one country is less efficient
than if pursued in all countries has frequently been pointed out in the
literature on fiscal policy coordination problems (see e.g. Van der Ploeg (1991),
Goodhart-Smith (1993), Abrham et al. (1991)). As we have seen, this principle
only holds in so far as fiscal spillovers are positive.
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4. Conclusions
Will policy makers within the institutional framework of the
EMU designed by the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP be able to shelter
member countries against undesirable macroeconomic fluctuations?
This question, which has accompanied the EMU since its conception, is
still unsettled. However, downgrading the stabilization problem in the
EMU may be dangerous because excess instability and the perception of
a lack of protection against adverse conditions may in the long run
undermine people's confidence in this crucial new institution of the
European Union, and political pressure may arise against central
bank's independence.
So far, theoretical research has mostly focused on the
assumption that policy makers are undisciplined, in the sense that they
pursue short-term goals that are inconsistent with long-run stability,
and/or that national FAs have conflicting goals with the central MA.
More recently, research has started investigating how the EMU may
perform if, say as a long run evolution of preferences induced by the
existing rules themselves, policy maker will eventually be disciplined.
I have examined the stabilization problem by means of an AD-
LM-AS model with stochastic demand disturbances hitting two
representative member countries of the EMU.   Each country has a
national FA (which controls its own fiscal budget) vis-à-vis a single
common MA (which controls money supply). Shocks may be unilateral
or they may be correlated across the economies (asymmetric shocks) up
to the case of perfect correlation (symmetric shocks). Shocks and policy
variables spread their effects across countries through the intra-EMU
trade channel and through the financial channel created by  common
dependence on the same interest rate and floating exchange rate.
Absent any inflation bias or policy dilemma, both decentralized fiscal
policies and centralized monetary policy may in principle be used as
stabilizers, but a traditional assignment problem arises. The model
allows the following main conclusions to be drawn.
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1) Under symmetric shocks either central monetary policy or
decentralized fiscal policies can fully stabilize each country and the
EMU as a whole. However, in general the two assignments are not
equally efficient. The efficiency (e.g. minimum variance) of
monetary policy increases as the parameter governing the negative
spillover of fiscal imbalances (yrq /mr)  is larger.
2) In the event of asymmetric shocks (ρ < 1), centralized monetary
policy can fully stabilize the EMU as a whole (its average inflation
rate) but not each country. Therefore, decentralized fiscal policies
are the only assignment consistent with full stabilization.
3) In the event of asymmetric shocks of any degree, and for any sign of
fiscal spillovers, the unco-ordinated (Nash) equilibrium of national
budget choices always achieve both domestic and EMU stabilization.
However, the efficiency of decentralized fiscal policies decreases to
the extent that negative fiscal spillovers are larger.
4) If negative fiscal spillovers are substantial, cet. par. larger budget
imbalances are necessary. Therefore, a FA may find its optimal
budget choice constrained by the SGP deficit ceiling. Constrained
stabilization is never superior to the  Nash equilibrium of
unconstrained budget choices.
These conclusions highlight that the popular idea of an efficient
"division of labour" between one "monetary giant" attending union-wide
stabilization and many "fiscal dwarfs" coping with their own domestic
stabilization may turn out be overly simplistic, even in the most
favourable case in which policy makers face no policy dilemmas. Firstly,
in a world where shocks are generally correlated and unevenly
distributed across countries, rather than being neatly symmetric or
unilateral, the informational basis of the assignment choice may be
flimsy. Secondly, and more importantly, we have seen that the
assignment choice between centralized monetary stabilization and
decentralized fiscal stabilization is not unconditional but  depends on
the net effect of the spillovers  triggered by national budget imbalances.
The architects of the EMU argue that negative fiscal spillovers may be
such a serious problem that  the adoption of the budget contraint in the
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SGP is justified. If this presumption is true, then centralized monetary
policy is the right choice in the event of symmetric shocks, but by the
same token decentralized fiscal policies are not the most efficient choice
in the event of asymmetric shocks. Remarkably, this assignment would
give rise to larger swings in fiscal budgets, in the  interest rate and in
the euro rate as the by-product of a system intended to limit fiscal
activism. If then national FAs are bound to use the fiscal instrument
although it is inefficient, they  should be granted more, not less, room
for fiscal manoeuvre, whereas the SGP budget constraint may induce
under-stabilization in the system. Finally, to the extent that FAs
consistently  pursue pure stabilization, co-ordination or unco-ordination
of fiscal policies is a matter of indifference as far as the efficiency loss of
stabilization is concerned.
Whether the flaws in the EMU stabilization mechanisms will
materialize, and how seriously, remain open questions essentially
dependent on empirical factors. Yet this study has an institutional
implication too. In so far as the rules of disciplined policy conduct
embedded in the EMU are successful in shaping all actors' preferences
and behaviours, then in the long run the instruments introduced to
enforce those rules will probably hinder stabilization. If such enforcing
instruments are deemed necessary in the transition from undisciplined
to disciplined policy-making, their progressive removal may be
advisable as the transition proceeds.
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Appendix
A.1. List of variables
Countries (i = 1, 2)
pii change in the price level (temporary inflation)
yi change in aggregate demand
gi non-structural component of the government budget
δi demand shock
zi change in output
εi supply shock
mdi change in money demand
mi change in the money stock
λi money demand shock
µi money supply shock
θi spread on the EMU interest rate
qi change in the terms of trade (effective real exchange rate)
ri = r + θi total variation in the domestic interest rate
All shocks are i.i.d. with zero mean.
EMU:
r change in the interest rate
pi, pie inflation and expected inflation
z change in output
m change in money supply
x, xe    change, and expected change, in the euro exchange rate
(euro x 1 unit of foreign currency)
ROW:
rw   change in the interest rate
piw, piew  inflation and expected inflation
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A.2. A pure stabilization regime
A pure stabilization regime is one in which the only objective of
each national FA and the BCE is to stabilize inflation and output gaps
after shocks with no alteration of long-run equilibrium values (no
"inflation" or "deficit" biases). To this effect, any policy-maker i's
objective can be represented by minimization of a standard additive
quadratic loss function Li, defined over logarithmic inflation and output
gaps, pii and zi, where targets coincide with long-run equilibrium values
which are normalized to 1:
Li = αpii2 + βzi2, (α,
β) ∈ [0,1]
This formulation can be specialized in different  ways. It can be
used as a standard Barro-Gordon representation of an unbiased policy-
maker (where it is generally set α = 1) reflecting the social preferences
for output stability β. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the convex
combination of the MA's exclusive commitment to price stability and of
the FA's  commitment to output stability (in which case, α+β = 1), as in
the models by De Grauwe (2000) and Buti et al. (2001).
Private agents should form their inflation expectations before
shocks are observed and policy choices are made. Initially, suppose that
all private agents believe in the full stabilization regime, and set piie = pie
= 0. Then, according to the output gap equation 0, we can write
Li = (α + βzpi)pii2
Using the inflation equations 0-(2.17) to determine pii, we obtain
Li = (α + βzpi)(∆'vv + ∆'δδi)2
where v is the vector of policy instruments v = gi, m,  ∆'v is the vector of
respective coefficients, and ∆'δ is the vector of domestic and imported
coefficients of the shock δi.
Minimization of this function by means of any instrument v,
while taking all other instruments as given, yields the first order
condition
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2∆v(α + βzpi)(∆'vv + ∆'δδi) = 0
Therefore,
i) the solution of this problem is equivalent to straightforward full
stabilization of inflation pii = 0 regardless of preference parameters α
and β, as is done in the text,
ii) the intial belief piie = pie = 0 is also the rational expectation of inflation
in each country and in the system.
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